The bill would let students at public colleges keep institutional awards and private scholarships up to their federally defined level of financial need. A second bill expands access to medical records by best-interest attorneys for senior citizens and minors.
The bill was unanimously passed by both the House and Senate. The state’s political leaders also signed a tax credit bill that allows retired first responders 55 years or older to exempt the first ,000 of retirement income from state taxes, a measure that has knocked around the General Assembly for a number of years before becoming law. Ron Young, D-District 3, curbs “scholarship-award displacement” — when colleges pull back institutional financial aid awards if a student receives private scholarships. The first streamlines the handgun permit application process by allowing buyers to provide their handgun qualification license number rather than having to provide a copy of the license.
Justice GREEN delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice JEFFERSON, Justice HECHT, Justice WAINWRIGHT, Justice MEDINA, and Justice WILLETT joined, and in which Justice JOHNSON and Justice LEHRMANN joined as to Parts I, II, IV and V. Justice GUZMAN did not participate in the decision.
C., Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae Texas Mutual Insurance Company. Darwin, Public Counsel, Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae Office of Injured Employee Counsel. Justice JOHNSON filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice LEHRMANN joined.
He applied for and received workers' compensation benefits for the work-related injury. This fee-shifting provision in § 408.221 did not exist until 2001. This multi-faceted review involving both evidentiary and discretionary matters is required by the language of the Act. In concluding that reasonableness and necessity of attorney's fees were matters of fact committed to a jury, we also noted that there are "factors prescribed by law which guide the determination of whether attorney fees are reasonable and necessary." Id. Crump has not pointed us to a reason to exempt § 408.221 from the general rule announced in those cases: "[T]he reasonableness of statutory attorney's fees is a jury question." City of Garland, 22 S. Nor do we see language in § 408.221 that distinguishes it from the language of the statutory regimes to which we applied the general rule in those cases. If the claimant prevails only on some issues, then after the jury's verdict is announced the court will apportion the fees per the factors in subsection (d), and will award reasonable and necessary attorney's fees to the claimant's attorney only for those issues on which the claimant prevails. First, Transcontinental did not procedurally preserve error regarding the "substantial factor" language because it did not request the language in the trial court. Hendrick Mem'l Hosp., , 973 (Tex.1943) ("[A] contractual relation arises under the Workmen's Compensation Law in which the employer, the employee and the insurer are the principal parties."). Corp., , 297 (Tex.1988) ("[W]e have warned that the provisions of the Act `should not be hedged about with strict construction, but should be given a liberal construction to carry out its evident purpose.'" (quoting Yeldell v. & Nursing Ctr., , 75 (1953) ("Since the workman coming under the terms of the Act is denied his common law rights it is held that the Act should be liberally construed in his favor.
The injury caused a contusion (bruise) and a hematoma (a collection of blood) at the wound site. We had to determine whether a judge or jury was to decide the amount of fees in order to answer another question: "[B]y what standard is such an award of attorney fees to be reviewed on appeal"? Because the Act read "may," the trial court had discretion to decide whether to award fees at all. We recognized that the Act limited this discretion in four ways: reasonableness, necessity, equity, and justice. Unreasonable fees cannot be awarded, even if the court believed them just, but the court may conclude that it is not equitable or just to award even reasonable and necessary fees. The principles established for construing statutory fee-shifting provisions in City of Garland and Bocquet assist the interpretation of § 408.221(c) of the Texas Labor Code. The next step depends on whether the claimant totally or partially prevails on the issues appealed by the insurance carrier. Regardless of what the Court says "substantial factor" means legally, the implication of a cause being substantial to a lay juror is that the cause must be more than minor, even if the minor cause is a concurring cause without which the death or disability would not have occurred.